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Summary
This review puts  under the microscope   
the book by György Matolcsy, Governor 
of the National Bank of Hungary, and 
the successful economic policy lurking 
behind it. This monograph is richly il-
lustrated with elements from economic 
history and familiarises the reader with 
Hungary’s achievements in the field of 
fiscal and monetary policies, and their 
academic taxonomy.
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Introduction 
Academic theoreticians frequently strug-
gle with the problem of translating their 
intellectual creations into practice. On 
the other hand, practical specialists of-
ten face the question of the extent the 
systems developed by them can pass 
the scientific test. However, in this case 
these two challenges and the good solu-
tions elaborated for them seem to have 
been tackled simultaneously. In front of 
our eyes and now also read from a book, 
given that this is a review of György Ma-
tolcsy’s book entitled Balance and Growth, 
which is compared to the practice fol-
lowed and results achieved in the past 
few years.
The book was published in 2015 in 
Hungarian and English and, in essence, 
it is his lifework. And not merely in a sci-
entific sense. The author, Governor of 
the National Bank of Hungary, former 
Minister for National Economy between 
2010 and 2013, and Minister for Econo-
my between 2000 and 2002, is the person 
who dreamed up and implemented the 
Széchenyi National Development Plan 
of Hungary. These governance experi-
ences and the related scientific attitudes 
to the methodology of governance have 
always been present and had their impact 
felt simultaneously in Matolcsy’s work. 
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From the mid-1990s, he led a conserva-
tive economic workshop, where he es-
tablished a solid grounding in economic 
theory for his service as a minister at the 
turn of the millennium, and then in the 
period between 2002 and 2010, once 
again a researcher, he built the theoreti-
cal framework for Hungary’s economic 
improvement, and, with the approach 
of the general elections, a government 
programme (Matolcsy et al., 2008). Re-
turning to the position of Minister for 
National Economy in 2010, he imple-
mented a successful fiscal consolidation 
and created the fundamental conditions 
for growth. Once he has re-established 
fiscal health, he was appointed to head 
the central bank, which had been pursu-
ing a homogeneous monetary policy for 
more than twenty five years. To adjust 
to international changes and Hungary’s 
economic and social demand, he intro-
duced unconventional instruments. In 
other words, he restored the refinanc-
ing1 capacity of the real economy and 
ensured additional monetary tools2 for 
reducing government debt in a way that 
the contribution by the new government 
and György Matolcsy as minister and gov-
ernor of the central bank were at all times 
characterized by a stable economic policy 
and an accelerated tempo of activity.3 
Why this hyperactivity? 
For one thousand and one hundred years, 
the Hungarian nation and Hungary have 
been characterized by a phase delay and 
the consequent desperate attempts at 
convergence. The conquest of the terri-
tory of Hungary took place among Euro-
pean nations who had inhabited the area 
for several centuries and formed vari-
ous states. Then Hungary’s sovereignty 
was lost in 1526. This entailed a gap in 
national influence on economic policy, 
and for the next five hundred years our 
relations were characterized by a series 
of struggles for liberty and attempts at 
convergence and independence which, 
at times, also involved economic reforms. 
After World War I, territory, people and 
economic strength were lost. World War 
II was followed by forced inclusion into 
the Soviet bloc. By the end of the 1960s, 
reserves of domestic resources had run 
out, so then market elements were used 
to boost the planned economic sys-
tem.4 From the early 1970s, external in-
debtedness was inevitable to offset the 
waste of resources and losses made by 
the planned economy regime, in other 
words, the power of the communist élite 
was extended for two decades with the 
help of Western loans. In the current era, 
an effort has been made at convergence 
by importing the “raw” Anglo-Saxon neo-
liberal market economy model, gradually 
increasing the government debt from 
USD 20 billion at the time of the change 
of regime to USD 140 billion, while as a 
result of the unreasonable and fast pri-
vatization of state property, the nation 
was deprived of its wealth, which was still 
worsened by the population’s USD 40 bil-
lion of indebtedness through foreign cur-
rency loans taken out after 2004. All the 
frenzied neoliberal reform actions taken 
in the past few decades have failed one 
after the other.5 Our transition to a mar-
ket economy ran aground.6 However, re-
lying on appropriate social support (and 
expectation), from 2010 the new govern-
ment was in a position to take action.  It 
was obvious that if we continued to use 
the economic policy means that led us to 
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the crisis we would hardly recover from it. 
So we needed a new method of economic 
policy, determination and, most of all, so-
cial support. 
The essence of the New Hungarian 
Model
Unless public finances are balanced, eco-
nomic growth and convergence remain 
vain hopes. There was a requirement for 
the inclusion of international companies 
and banks in public financing – in other 
words, in the payment of taxes and con-
tributions according to their capabilities 
– and, simultaneously, for lowering taxes 
payable by domestic businesses and the 
population,7 for streamlining govern-
ment expenditures, and for a strict con-
trol of public funds, with the aggregate 
result that Hungary was released from the 
European Union’s Excessive Deficit Pro-
cedure. Without IMF loans and econom-
ic policy expectations8, public finance po-
sitions were consolidated from Hungary’s 
own resources. The government ensures 
room for manoeuver for the operation 
of market participants through the active 
economic policy framework of influenc-
ing9 and regulation10. 
It should be emphasized that there 
were reasons for the changes. By the sec-
ond half of the 2000s, Hungary’s econo-
my was facing increasingly conspicuous 
growth problems, a considerable budget 
deficit, a high sovereign debt and current 
account deficit. Certain periods were 
characterized by economic growth, oth-
ers by financial equilibrium. However, 
the two – equilibrium and growth – never 
coincided. After 2013, they did.
Since 2013, fiscal policy has been 
strengthened by reinforcing the elements 
of monetary mechanisms. The National 
Bank of Hungary is characterized by a 
more active citizenship manifest in the 
system of multiple mandate objectives. 
The central bank’s aim is to serve the 
common good at a macro-economic and 
social level. In the interest of the common 
good, it uses the available instruments to 
curb inflation and promotes economic 
growth and the maintenance of financial 
equilibrium. The first step in the change 
of monetary regime was the cycle of in-
terest rate cuts launched by the external 
members of the Monetary Council in the 
summer of 2012.11 The first phase of in-
terest rate cuts lasted until July 2015, and 
saw the refinancing base rate fall to 1.35 
per cent, the lowest rate in its 90 years of 
history, which then further dropped to 
0.9 per cent by May 2016 as a result of 
repeated rate cuts. The cycle of interest 
rate cuts reduces commercial banking 
rates and supports economic growth, 
while also facilitating the achievement of 
the central bank’s targeted medium-term 
inflation rate. Moreover, this also trig-
gered a positive change in the market for 
government securities and improved the 
safety of government debt financing. 
The Funding for Growth Scheme 
was launched with a method similar to 
the Funding for Lending Scheme of the 
Bank of England or to certain elements 
in the Quantitative Easing (QE) applied 
by the Fed. The FfG Scheme substantially 
improved access to loans for small and 
medium-size enterprises and agricultural 
producers, and so the corporate lending 
market regained impetus and could play 
a significant role in the unfolding of a 
change in investments.12 Access to loans 
opened up for 31,000 business entities, 
who borrowed more than two thousand 
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billion forints. This scheme contributed 
to economic growth and an increase in 
employment and, together with the bene-
ficial impacts of the cycle of interest cuts, 
it has catalysed economic growth in the 
past few years. 
The Self-Financing Programme 
launched in the spring of 2014 and was 
aimed at encouraging the purchase of 
liquid assets acceptable as collateral in 
order to reduce the country’s external 
vulnerability by cutting the gross external 
debt. The programme intensified com-
mercial banks’ purchase of government 
securities, which in turn also contributed 
to the mitigation of long-term govern-
ment security yields and so the (inter-
est) costs of financing public spending 
fell.13 One of the most significant actions 
taken by the central bank to achieve sta-
bility and ensure the efficient operation 
of financial markets was the consolida-
tion of retail foreign exchange loans by 
the central bank and the government,14 
which improved the financial equilib-
rium for households and banks alike.15 
The integration of the Hungarian Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority into the cen-
tral bank and the introduction and op-
eration of macro-prudential instruments 
also strengthened financial stability. The 
new system allows the National Bank of 
Hungary to prevent the building up of 
harmful risks at the level of the national 
economy, and to balance the financial 
system’s capacity to finance the economy. 
The central bank has made an effort 
to support the government’s economic 
policy. This monetary policy does not 
interfere with the independence of the 
central bank. What is happening is that 
the Government and the central bank 
are thinking in terms of a complex and 
unconventional system of public finance 
assets that serves the common good, as 
the fundamental goals of these two pub-
lic finance authorities are identical.16 In 
order to grow, the real economy needed 
an appropriate expansion of the loan 
portfolio, which was accomplished by 
the central bank through its Funding 
for Growth Scheme. International expe-
rience shows that central banks only as-
sume an “extreme” role in bridging crises 
and boosting economic upturn.17 How-
ever, maintaining the optimum level of 
commercial loans falls within the compe-
tence of the market and is increasingly a 
fiscal category. As a signal for these future 
processes, in November 2015, the central 
bank announced and then, in early 2016, 
launched its Growth Support Scheme, in 
an effort to use its more moderate means 
to keep the economy on a sustainable 
development trajectory. In addition to 
the gradual phasing out of the Funding 
for Growth Scheme, the purpose of the 
Growth Support Scheme is to encourage 
commercial banks to increasingly satisfy 
the borrowing demand of participants in 
the real economy. Besides the third phase 
of FfG, the Growth Support Scheme also 
comprises the Market Lending Scheme, 
which uses various risk and liquidity 
management tools to boost commercial 
banks’ lending activity. Through the 
Growth Support Scheme, net corporate 
lending, and especially loans to small and 
medium-size loans, may further increase.
After 2013, in addition to undertaking 
intensive development of the economy, 
the central bank also helped fiscal sta-
bilization through various channels. On 
the one hand, base rate cuts and the Self-
Financing Programme contributed to the 
moderation of government security yields 
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and interest expenses to a major extent. 
Between 2008 and 2015, interest pay-
ments were reduced by nearly 1 per cent 
of GDP.18 On the other hand, the central 
bank’s Funding for Growth Scheme had a 
beneficial catalysing impact on economic 
growth, and through an increase in the 
taxable amounts, it helped maintain the 
budget deficit below the level of 3 per 
cent that had been achieved by 2013. 
As a result of the change of the mon-
etary regime and responsible manage-
ment, the National Bank of Hungary has 
been achieving a public accounting and 
national economic profit since 2013.19 
It pays part of the profit, taken in an ac-
counting sense, to the central budget, 
and in the spirit of corporate citizenship 
it uses another part for the renewal of 
financial thinking, financial culture and 
the financial and economic refashioning 
of higher education. It supports higher 
education as an economic sector that 
produces new knowledge capital to the 
debit of its own profit rather than using 
budgetary funds or the taxpayers’ forints, 
i.e. public financing.20 It supports the in-
tellectual and academic workshops that 
create new and sophisticated knowledge 
capital to replace the old and obsolete 
system.21
Summary 
Balance and Growth, a 644-page book by 
György Matolcsy, is divided into 24 chap-
ters and describes the policy changes 
listed in this review and their impacts. 
You will not be able to put it down once 
you start reading it. It is about our daily 
life and economic relations, and explains 
them both in scholarly terms and in an 
easy-to-understand language. 
This makes the monography an aca-
demic outline of the practical system, and 
so the appreciative reader cannot avoid 
judging the current practice. Therefore 
it is perhaps even more objective and 
comprehensive if we do not predict the 
expected reception from the opinions 
of individual researchers, intellectual 
schools or parties. Recently, one of the 
international rating agencies22 evaluated 
Hungary’s economic policy of the past 
few years. In their notice they list the fac-
tors underpinning the upgrading and 
specify the extent to each factor contrib-
utes. Based on the latter, there are two 
categories: 
– factors considered as highly signifi-
cant (“high”),
– factors that justified the upgrading 
to a lesser extent (“medium”).
The “high” category includes a reduc-
tion in external vulnerability, in other 
words, the rating agency upgraded debt-
or rating primarily for this reason. They 
traced back the reduction in external vul-
nerability to 5 factors:
1. High surplus in the current account 
balance – this can be considered a struc-
tural feature.
2. Influx of funds from the European 
Union – for the most part, this is also a 
feature, although in this case, the very 
high ratio of drawdown can also be con-
sidered a Hungarian success.
3. Reduction in the external debt to 
banks – this is partly due to an endow-
ment, but the National Bank of Hungary 
also targeted numerous programmes 
(e.g. during the conversion of foreign 
currency loans to forint loans, when 
the National Bank of Hungary offered 
conditional facilities, as a prerequisite it 
required reduction in the short-term ex-
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ternal debt to banks, and certain macro-
economic prudential regulations also 
had such indirect effects). 
4. The Self-Financing Programme – 
the rating agency specifically highlights 
this central bank programme, which is 
a fairly significant recognition for the 
scheme (and could well end the relevant 
debate stirred in the Hungarian media).23 
5. The conversion of foreign curren-
cy loans to forint loans – naturally, this 
programme is not exclusively run by the 
National Bank of Hungary, however, the 
central bank was the catalyst of the pro-
cess and provided the required nearly 
EUR 10 billion worth of currency for the 
conversion.
Thus, overall, the upgrading was due 
partly to improvement in the structural 
fundamentals of the economy and partly 
due to the successes of the specific eco-
nomic policy programmes – and the 
schemes launched by the National Bank 
of Hungary were especially emphasised in 
the latter group, while debt cutting and 
the budgetary processes can be classified 
in the other category (“medium”), which 
means that despite their positive effects, 
they contributed less to the upgrading.
This book by György Matolcsy is about 
the economic policy innovations leading 
to success, in other words, the manner 
and instruments applied in achieving this 
success. It is worth reading. 
György Matolcsy: Balance and Growth. 
Kairosz Kiadó, Budapest, 2015, 644 pages. 
Notes
1  By ensuring longer-term loans at a lower than 
market rate for the investments of less well-cap-
italized and liquid businesses and agricultural 
producers. For a more detailed explanation and 
the significance of this financial category, see 
Lentner, 2016.
2  Low interest rate, the expansion of supervisory 
powers, a Self-Financing Programme, the Fund-
ing for Growth Scheme, and the creation of an 
efficient system of financial customer protection.
3  With strong political, government and Prime 
Ministerial support. Quoting Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán, “one of the most important parts 
of economic policy is policy”. In other words, 
the implementation of clear political value prin-
ciples and their good political communication 
by competent persons, and political support for 
fruitful actions and concept makers are indis-
pensable for success. 
4  The New Economic Mechanism of 1968 put mar-
ket elements  into operation in a limited way 
that would not violate the basis of the planned 
economy. In the early 1970s this new trend lost 
a significant amount impetus as a result of the 
political restoration.
5  The avid enforcement of the New Public Man-
agement DPM paradigm, i.e. in the spirit of 
decentralisation, privatization and the opera-
tion of the state with a management approach 
(to maximize profit). In the real economy and 
in finances, deregulation was undertaken and 
the loss-making sectors were eliminated without 
pondering their social effects. Recurrent tight-
ening and austerity measures were imposed on 
residents, the most significant being the 1995 
economic policy adjustment package and the 
convergence adjustment package launched in 
the autumn of 2006. 
6  In my opinion, a stagnant “transitional” econom-
ic policy prevailed between the late 1980s and 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union, al-
though accession did not bring along consolida-
tion and, what is more, the macro-economic and 
equilibrium data deteriorated, and so I would 
rather extend the period of homogeneous Hun-
garian economic methodology to 2010.
7  Halving the corporate income tax rate levied on 
(typically domestic) businesses with net sales rev-
enues up to HUF 500 million, and cutting per-
sonal income tax from 36 to 16 and then to 15 
per cent. 
8  By the elimination of the mandatory economic 
policy consultation (literally meaning: force) ac-
cording to Section IV of the IMF Statute, with 
the most frequent element being the budget 
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tightening policy imposed on residents from Af-
rica to Central Europe. 
9  The generation of domestic solvent demand, 
opening to the East – as a result of government 
actions. 
10  Bank regulation, financial customer protection, 
and fiscal and monetary mechanisms. 
11  This was the time when the members delegated 
to the Monetary Council by the Orbán regime 
attained a majority.
12  The FfG also provides an opportunity for pre-
financing the investment funds frequently diffi-
cult to draw down from the European Union. 
13  For more details about the Self-Financing Pro-
gramme, see Kolozsi, 2015.
14  It started in 2011 with the granting of prepay-
ment and final repayment and the setting of an 
exchange rate cap, continued with the strength-
ening of financial customer protection, and was 
completed, at the end of 2014, with the conver-
sion of foreign currency loans into forints using 
the central bank’s foreign currency reserves. 
15  For more information about the foreign cur-
rency loan consolidation, see Lentner, 2015. 
16  Separately, with their own particular instruments. 
17  See, for example, the interest rate policy and 
other monetary tools adopted by FED after the 
QE period. 
18  For a comparison: it increased by nearly one per 
cent in Romania and by 2 per cent in Slovenia in 
the same period.
19  The accounting profit, or the profit recognized 
in the annual report, and the economic profit, 
whose effects are enjoyed by families relieved 
from exchange rate exposure, businesses con-
templating investment and public finances.
20  However, this is done in a way such that only the 
interest paid on the capital available for the vari-
ous Pallas Athene foundations is allowed to be 
used as resources for the support. 
21  Similarly, it backs other intellectual workshops 
provided that they are capable of renewal and 
the generation of new scientific results.
22  Quoted from the May 2016 upgrading by 
Fitch Ratings, which classified Hungary 
among the countries recommended for in-
vestment, https://www.fitchratings.com/site/
pressrelease?id=1004883. Since then, Fitch’s fa-
vourable rating was followed by another agency 
(Standard and Poor’s), and so Hungary has 
been upgraded to investment-grade. 
23  See, for example, the article entitled Aim and 
Reality by György Surányi, former central bank 
governor, in: Népszabadság, 14 May 2016. 
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